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I. INTRODUCTION 
Council Regulations (EEC) No 3013/89 and No 805/68 require that the Commission make a report, 
before 1 July 1996, on the application of the arrangements laid down in the individual producer 
limits in the annual ewe and suckler cow premium schemes respectively, together with, where 
appropriate, any necessary proposals. This report fulfills that obligation. The report is designed to 
look at the administrative experiences of applying the premium quota systems since the 1992 
Reform. Its preparation began before the current BSE crisis and it does not represent the 
Commission's views over how the beef regime shall be adapted following the crisis. It does, 
nevertheless, form part of the background which will need to be taken into account when ideas for 
changing the beef regime are assessed. 
The origins of the premium quotas can be traced to the 1992 CAP Reform when solutions to two 
problems common to the Community's sheep and beef sectors were sought: the trend of increasing 
internal production coupled with escalating Community expenditure. In the sheep sector, rising 
production in the 1980*s, stimulated by readily available premiums, was undermining Community 
prices and, owing to the price compensatory method of calculation of the ewe premium, causing a 
dramatic growth in Community expenditure. In the beef sector, after several years of greater 
surpluses, the Reform provided the opportunity to shift policy, in the light of the necessary 
adjustments of production to internal consumption trends and export possibilities, in particular those 
relating to the approaching GATT commitments, away from beef price support through costly 
intervention mechanisms and more towards direct payments to producers as premia. 
In the sheep sector, the Commission's response to these pressures was to propose, in the context of 
the 1992 Reform, to replace the stabilizer, which had proved incapable of controlling production, 
with the requirement that a producer must hold a right to each Ewe Premium and to establish 
individual producer limits to the number of those rights, a policy more commonly known as the 
introduction of 'individual quotas'. The aim of this measure was to limit the number of animals kept 
by individual producers since stockrearing without premium, in most circumstances, is unprofitable. 
For the beef sector, the compromise on the whole of the 1992 Reform extended this idea of 
individual quotas to suckler cows. The reasons for this were that the Council compromise included 
a bigger increase on the Suckler Cow Premium than the Commission had already proposed and that 
Council wanted to ensure that this increase did not lead to an uncontrolled increase in the suckler 
cow herd. Furthermore, the introduction of limits on the eligibility to premia in the beef sector 
proved valuable in the final stages of the negotiation of the GATT agreement which followed the 
1992 Reform. 
The basic regulations establishing individual quotas in the two sectors ' , similar in their main 
outline, laid down that the quotas be allocated to each active producer, on the basis of the number 
of premiums paid in a past "reference" year 2, particular to the sector involved. Member States were 
Articles 5a - 5d of Regulation (EEC) No 3013/89 for the sheep sector and Articles 4e and 4f of Regulation 
(EEC) No 805/68 for the beef sector. 
From 1995 onwards, in the sheep sector, owing to the introduction of individual quotas, the Council's former 
'headage limit1 rule, by which the payment of ewe premium was made at the full rate for producers with no 
more than 1000 ewes in LFA's and 500 ewes in non-LFA's, became superfluous and was abolished. The net 
also given some latitude in choosing the reference year. General rules to accommodate the case of 
producers who did not claim premium in the reference year and the distribution of rights within 
producer groups were also made. 
As a consequence, the total sum of all the individual producer limits in each of these two sectors 
constitutes a virtual ceiling to their productive capacities and sets a maximum Community 
expenditure for their support. Furthermore, fixing a total number of ewe and suckler cow premium 
rights in each of the new Member States which entered the Union in 1995, decided as part of the 
Accession agreements, maintained the philosophy of limiting productive capacity in the two sectors. 
Council legislation also gave producers the opportunity to adjust each year the number of rights they 
hold to premium through the provisions for transfer and, should the Member State so choose, 
temporary leasing of quota. Member States were given the option of setting up a "commercial" 
system of transfers which allows producers to deal directly between themselves or an 
"administrative" system in which rights are transferred via the national reserve. Only one Member 
State, France, chose the latter option. Except for certain demarcated zones in each Member State 
out of which rights may not transferred because sheep or beef production is especially important, 
a producer is allowed to transfer rights to another producer, either with his holding or without. 
However, transfers without the holding must surrender up to 15% of the transferred rights to the 
national reserve, a procedure more commonly known as the 'syphon'. 
The national reserve of premium rights in each Member State was set up by retaining between 1 
and 3% of the initial individual allocation of rights and was used to reallocate rights amongst 
suggested priority categories of producers, determined according to each Member State's own 
criteria. In addition, Council agreed to the creation of a non-forfeitary initial reserve equal to 1% 
of the sum of the rights in less-favoured areas (LFA's). 
Council subsequently instructed the Commission to make detailed rules for the application of the 
quota systems 3 which, due to the similarity between the sectors in the Council policy, followed a 
common philosophy in their initial conception and subsequent refinement. 
This report, within the limits already indicated above, addresses the production and budgetary 
consequences of the policy and the outcomes of the main Council provisions laid down in what has 
been a preliminary period of setting up the system. It is based on the information supplied to the 
Commission by Member States and any comments will be confined to those items on which data 
are available. 4 For the most part, the measures described only affected those Member States which 
were part of the Union before the CAP reform. However, where appropriate, new Member States 
will be included in the appraisal. In addition, a brief review of the detailed implementing rules, 
adopted by the Commission, is presented. 
3 
effect on a producer's quotas was that those rights held above the 'headage limits' (on which the producer had 
been able to claim premium at half the full rate) were converted into full-rate rights at half the number. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3567/92 for the sheep sector and Regulation (EEC) No 3886/92 for the beef 
sector. 
For example, since it is not a statutory requirement from Member States, the Commission is not in possession 
of any official data concerning aspects of quota trading such as the number of rights leased or the value of 
rights on the open market. 
II. THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING 
a) Production 
Annex I shows the trends in sheepmeat and beef production in the 5 years prior to the 1992 Reform, 
and the evolution of those parameters subsequent to the introduction of the individual quota policy. 
It can be seen clearly that the quota policy has brought an effective stabilisation of Community 
sheepmeat production, at around 1.15m tonnes/year, a result which would not have been achievable 
under the stabiliser mechanism operating previously for the same purpose. 
On the other hand, in the beef sector, the data do not show the same degree of curtailment in 
production. The Reform came into effect towards the end of a period with a downward trend in 
production (1991-1994). Production has now recovered again, and is set to continue upwardly 
because, although dairy cow numbers have fallen, there has been a sustained growth in the EU 
suckler cow herd in recent years (Annex II). This expansion in suckler cow numbers has occurred 
because, despite the introduction of individual quotas, there have been notable increases to the total 
number of premium rights fixed at the outset of the system, namely: 
i) the increase in the total claims in 1992 witnessed in practically all Member States 5 who 
took the option available to them of fixing 1992 as the reference year (i.e. the same year 
as the introduction of the quotas themselves), as producers responded to the fact that 
premium rights were now in limited supply. The effect of this decision was tc raise premium 
claims by 1.3 million, that is by 15%, in 1992 compared with 1991, in the Member States 
concerned, which added an equivalent number of rights to the EU total, and to create a 
situation where there was enough quota available across the Union to sustain an increase in 
suckler cow numbers of 9% between 1992 and 1995. 
ii) the raising of the milk ceiling from 60.000 to 120.000 litres per holding in the mixed 
suckler/dairy cow enterprises responded to the request of certain Member States, made 
during the CAP Reform, to extend the quota scheme to medium-sized mixed herds. 
Acceptance of such holdings resulted in 821.160 extra rights being created. 
Thus, the control ('maitrise') of production and expenditure that was expected from the introduction 
of individual producer limits for suckler cow premium can only begin to take effect once the EU 
suckler cow herd has approached the limit set by the total number of rights available (Annex ÎI). 
Given that around one million rights still remain unused and that the other support mechanisms 
which operate in the beef sector may allow producers to keep more stock than they have quota for, 
complete stabilization of the EU suckler cow herd, and the Community budget which supports it, 
is not likely to occur in the near future. 
5
 Only Greece did not choose 1992 as the reference year. 
b) Community expenditure 
The other principal objective of the introduction of individual limits in the ewe and suckler cow 
premium regimes was to control spending. 
In the sheep sector, this task was relatively straightforward: putting a limit to the potential number 
of ewes in the Community would limit total expenditure, save for those fluctuations which arise due 
to changes in average Community market price, a parameter used in the calculation of the annual 
ewe premium. 
Annex III shows that the quota regime has indeed had the desirable result of constraining spending 
in ewe premium to around 1.700 MECU. 
For the beef sector, the introduction of individual quotas for suckler cow premium was part of an 
overall reform which brought a reduction in market price support measures (intervention), 
compensated by increases in the level of premiums and a revised export refund policy. Therefore, 
Annex III shows that expenditure in suckler cow premium has increased substantially in the past 
15 years. The increase in the cost of the suckler cow premium regime is partly due to the increase 
in the level of the premium 6 and partly due to the increases in the number of rights available, in 
line with the argument on cow numbers already given, but expenditure could be expected, from 
current information, to stabilise at a maximum of 1.800 MECU per year once the unused and 
additional rights mentioned in section (i) above have been taken up. 
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH 
FALL UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE 
Within the Council's implementing rules, certain decisions concerning the application of the 
producer limits were delegated to Member States. This measure of flexibility operated in live main 
areas: 
a) The reference year and the initial allocation of rights. 
The reference year chosen in each Member State may be found in Annex IV for the sheep sector 
(for the most part, 1991) and Annex V for the beef sector, where 1992 was most generally adopted. 
In addition, Annex IV shows for the sheep sector a 'coefficient' calculated for those Member States 
where the total number of ewes decreased between 1989 and 1991 and where this coefficient was 
used to calculate an extra number of rights to be added to the individual limit of each producer. This 
was the case in Spain, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
The suckler cow premium was programmed in 1992 to rise from 70 ECU in 1993, 90 ECU in 1994 and to 120 
ECU per head in 1995. 
Resulting from these calculations, Annex VII for the sheep sector, and Annex VIII for the beef 
sector, show the potential, or sum total, of premium rights available in each Member State for 
allocation to individual producers upon the introduction of the quota system. The figures presented 
have been verified for the sheep sector 7 by the Commission on the basis of the reference year 
chosen by each Member State. The figures for suckler cow premium rights await the Commission's 
approval. The potential rights for the new Member States are also included, these totals having been 
agreed upon Accession and incorporated into each sector's base regulation. 
Aside from the problem mentioned above concerning premium claims in 1992 in the beef sector and 
the notable administrative effort required in the exercise, no particular difficulties were encountered 
with this measure in most Member States. In general, the provisions made for producers who had 
not made claims or who had been penalised in the reference year were successful in their 
implementation because they permitted Member States to deal equitably with those hardship cases 
which arose. However, in the sheep sector, Italy and Greece did express to Council the problems 
which they had experienced in fixing individual limits amongst producers who, for various reasons, 
had underclaimed in the reference year and were not covered by the existing provisions. 
Consequently, in 1995, Council agreed that, subject to verification by the Commission,8 Italy and 
Greece should be allowed to distribute up to 600.000 additional rights from the national reserve to 
accommodate those producers who had not received their correct initial quota. 
b) The initial national reserves. 
Annexes IV, V and VI again show the approach taken by each Member State, within the limits of 
the Council legislation, for the setting up of the initial national reserves in both sectors. While 
globally the measures taken supplied the national reserve in each Member State with 1 to 3% of the 
total sum of the individual limits, the tables illustrate that the percentage of rights forfeited in 
relation to the size of the individual producer limit varied appreciably. Annexes VII and VIII 
illustrate the numbers of rights which were available to establish the national reserves, including the 
extra rights resulting from the additional 1% LFA reserve . 
In this respect, it must be noted that, from the outset, the national reserves in the different Member 
States have been under varying pressure from the demand of producers. The limited United 
Kingdom national reserves, in both sectors, originally set at 1% of the total rights, have particularly 
high demand and considerable administrative difficulties have been experienced in satisfying 
applications from producers. On the other hand, the Netherlands, after fixing a relatively high 
percentage forfeit of rights to the national reserve (3%) under circumstances of low suckler cow 
premium demand, had to refix the forfeit at 1% and subsequently return the surplus rights to 
producers. 
Final verification still awaited for the figure for Germany and Italy (Sipjly). 
In the verification carried out in April 1996, the Commission agreed to an increase to the national reserves in 
Italy and Greece by 600.000 rights. 
c) The system of quota transfers and leasing. 
In general terms, the operation of the system of quota transfer is uniform across the Community 
with most Member States opting for the direct producer-to-producer transfers while also permitting 
temporary leasing of rights. The two notable exceptions to this norm are to be found in France, 
which only allows direct transfers to occur between producers when the entire holding is also 
transferred, all other operations taking place as transfers from a producer to the national reserve and 
the Netherlands, where no temporary leasing is permitted. 
No insuperable problems in the operation of the transfer system have been experienced by Member 
States and producers appear to have adapted well to the obligations placed on them by the 
administrative procedures put in place to effect such transfers. The French authorities have registered 
the difficulties they have faced due to the extra effort and complications associated with the 
"administrative" system which they adopted. The Commission has responded to these requests with 
a series of adjustments to the detailed rules aimed at simplifying as far as possible the transfer 
procedures, 9 while at the same time avoiding an excessive divergence between the two systems. 
The level at which the 'syphon' is applied in each Member State may be seen, in Annexes IV, V and 
VI to vary between the 1% operating in the Netherlands to the 15% applied in the majority of 
Member States. In this respect, the 'syphon' has proven itself to be an acceptable and workable 
policy instrument for supplying a certain number of right to the national reserve which may be 
redistributed to priority groups by the Member States (see below). 
d) Management of the national reserves. 
In numerical terms, the supply of rights to the national reserve by the 'syphon' may be seen in 
Annexes X-XIII, which show the functioning of the national reserves in both sectors for 1993 and 
1994. The data for 1995 have only been supplied by a few Member States. 
Although the 'syphon' was rather insignificant in the first year of the operation of the national 
reserves, in comparison with the initial number of rights, in 1994 it contributed around a third of 
the rights available from the national reserve to sheep producers each year, upon request to the 
national authorities. 
In the beef sector, the contribution of rights from the 'syphon' to the national reserve remains at a 
lower level (4% in 1994), though it makes an important contribution to the rights available in the 
national reserves in Belgium and Portugal. The relatively minor rôle of the 'syphon' is probably a 
reflection of the smaller number of transfers without holding which take place in the beef sector, 
in comparison to the sheep sector where transactions are, generally speaking, more mobile. 
The same tables (Annexes X-XIII) also illustrate the functioning of the national reserves in terms 
of the attribution of rights to producers. 
These measures, forming part of the 1994 Simplification Exercise of the CAP Reform, are described in 
Chapter IV below. 
In the sheep sector in 1993, over 90% of the initial reserve was allocated to producers though this 
percentage fell to around 38% in 1994, with Spain, Italy and the Netherlands having the lowest 
percentage allocations. Furthermore, the data in Annex XII suggest that, in 1994, several Member 
States (in particular Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) withdrew rights 
from producers as a result of transfers without holding (the 'syphon') and then 'recycled' those rights 
to other producers from the national reserve with respect to the same marketing year. 
In the beef sector, the demand on the initial national reserve was relatively low in 1993 (48%) but 
remained more constant the following year, a Community average of 53% of the rights being 
attributed to producers in 1994. Furthermore, an analysis of the data with respect to the 1994 
calendar year indicate that the practice of 'recycling' rights is much less widespread in the beef 
sector than the sheep sector: only Belgium attributed to producers all the rights which were available 
in its 1994 national reserve. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain did not attribute any rights from 
the national reserve in 1994 because ofdifllcultics in making a fair allocation of rights which would 
satisfy the extremely high demand. 
In general terms, the management of the national reserves has not posed unsurmountable 
complications for national administrations, given the important extent to which decision-making was 
delegated to Member States in this area. However, in the United Kingdom, there has been a 
significant problem with some producers in both sectors of the so-called 'developers' priority 
category who, owing to the insufficient number of rights available in the 1993 national reserve, were 
not initially allocated all the rights they requested. Following a judgment in a national court, the UK 
authorities decided to reallocate part of the national reserve for this category of producers which has 
caused a delay in closing definitively the allocation exercise for 1993 and subsequent years. 
e) Sensitive Zones 
A further measure within the competence of Member States is illustrated in Annexes IV, V and VI 
which indicate the zones designated as particularly important for sheep and beef production and, 
therefore, out of which premium rights may not be transferred. This designation has been more 
colloquially known as 'ring-fencing'. 
Most Member States have 'ring-fenced' the LFA's of their territory, a decision which is coherent 
with their policy priorities for such areas. The two notable exceptions to this norm are found in 
France and the United Kingdom. Firstly, the French authorities have nominated the entire French 
territory a Sensitive Zone. Secondly, the United Kingdom authorities have divided their whole 
territory into seven Sensitive Zones, based on regional and LFA criteria. The only other exceptions 
are Belgium, divided for these purposes into two zones according to land classification, and 
Germany which specified the dykelands, as well as the LFA's of its territory, as a Sensitive Zone. 
The designation of these Sensitive Zones has widespread acceptance from all interested parties and 
the Commission has received no evidence, to date, to suppose that the measure, within the terms 
in which it was originally conceived, has been misused or misapplied. 10 
However, some Member States have expressed their concern that within certain 'ring-fences' rights may be 
accumulating and having a negative impact of an environmental nature (see Evaluation below) . 
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IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S DETAILED RULES FOR THE 
APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS 
The most pertinent rules in the Commission Regulations for applying individual producer limits in 
the sheep and beef sectors have the following basic structure: 
a) Individual limits 
In order to make the administration of the producer limits as workable as possible, for the ewe 
premium, only those producers with a minimum of 10 ewes were allocated an initial quota. In 
suckler cow premium, owing to the greater economic value of each animals, no lower limit was set. 
b) Usage rules 
Several rules were introduced in the regulations by which a producer would forfeit to the national 
reserve a certain proportion of his rights if he did not claim premium on those rights during 
determined periods. The aim of these rules was to increase the mobilization of rights by avoiding 
an excessive number of rights staying with producers who did not use themselves and, furthermore, 
did not choose to transfer or lease those rights to another producer. 
For this purpose, a general usage rule was defined whereby a producer, who has not made use of 
at least 50% of his rights during two consecutive years, would forfeit the part not used during the 
last year to the national reserve. Moreover, with the intention of deterring speculative acquisition 
of rights by producers who did not intend to use them immediately, a more stringent usage rule was 
placed on those producers who receive rights free of charge from the national reserve. At the outset 
of the quota system, if such a producer did not make use of all his rights during the three years 
following the receipt of rights from the national reserve, he would forfeit the part not used n . 
Furthermore, the same producer was not authorized to transfer or lease any rights during that three 
year period. 
The latest change to be made in the usage rules, which came into force in 1996 as part of the 1994 
simplification exercise, unified these two rules into one, such that the minimum percentage usage 
has been raised to 70% each year. This measure aims to prompt producers to mobilize the rights 
which they could retain under the existing, relatively lenient, general usage rule. On the other hand, 
such a simplification of the rules was justified because the risk posed by speculative requests for 
rights from the national reserve had not been fulfilled. 
1
 ' A couple of years into the system, it became evident that producers who had received rights from the national 
reserve and, in the extreme case a small number, were under an excessively heavy obligation in having to use 
all the rights they owned during the following three years: even natural fluctuations in flock size could cause 
them to have to surrender part of their rights. Therefore, it was decided to relax the rule to an average usage 
of 90% over the same three year period. This relaxation was subsequently taken further in 1996 by the 
introduction of a single usage rule (70% every year). 
c) The transfer and leasing mechanisms 
For clarity and ease in the operation, the Commission legislation introduced a minimum to the 
number of rights which may be transferred or leased n at any one time, with both parlies involved 
having an obligation to notify the competent authorities of the transfer within a deadline, two 
months before the premium claim was made. However, once the transfer system was set up and 
running, Member States became aware that simplification in some of the associated procedures was 
necessary, particularly in France where the 'administrative' system is operated. In time for the 1995 
premium claims, the minimum number of rights involved in a transfer without holding were 
simplified by rewording the previous formula which was based on percentages of the producer's 
quota. 
At the same time, the deadline for notification of a transfer was redefined so as to allow producers 
to notify the authorities up until the day on which they made their premium claim. It therefore gives 
producers and administrations more time to organize and to process transfers and reduces the 
confusion between the deadline for transfer notification and the deadline for premium claim which 
had arisen amongst producers. 
However, where the Commission legislation provided the most significant concessions to the rules 
on transfers has been on the opening of second trading periods in both sectors in both 1993 and 
1994 ' \ These derogations were justified because of transitional problems at the outset of the 
regime, in particular, producers across the whole Community experienced appreciable difficulty in 
trading quota or acquiring from the national rights sufficient rights to cover their premium claims 
within the deadlines originally set. 
Finally, as an example taken from the sheep sector, the various deadlines for applications and 
notifications which have resulted from the application of the Commission rules in each Member 
State, are summarized in Annex XIV for the 1995 marketing year. 
12 In order to avoid a producer holding onto rights by leasing them out to another producer for an unlimited length 
of time, a rule was instituted which obliges producers to use all their rights during at least two consecutive 
years over a five-year period. Since this rule means that producers could lease out rights from the beginning 
of the quota system in 1993 for three years, 1996 is, in effect, the first year of its application. 
A second trading period was admitted for 1995 and 1996 but does not apply to all Member States: only Italy 
and Greece were given this provision to assist in the allocation of the 600.000 extra ewe rights conceded by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1265/95 and the UK may open a second period for 1995 in both sectors (and for 
1996 in sheep) in order to accommodate those producers affected by delays in the distribution of the 1993 
national reserve. 
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V. EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At what is still a relatively early stage in the implementation of the policy of individual producer 
limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium schemes, the Commission has a number of comments 
to make on the development of the regime and the progress made so far. 
a) Controlling production and spending 
i) The most important consequence of introducing producer quotas for ewe premium has been 
the control effected on sheepmeat production and Community expenditure in the sector. 
ii) In the beef sector, for the reasons indicated above, the same degree of control in production 
and expenditure has manifestly not been attained. 
b) National reserves and their management 
iii) The lighter pressure on the beef national reserves than on the sheep reserves, in the first two 
years of the operation, is consistent with the Commission's concern that, even before the 
BSE crisis, the current state of the suckler cow premium quotas is failing to exert the 
necessary control on production. The most important reasons why the beef national reserves 
are not under pressure is that most Member States adopted 1992 as the reference year for 
suckler cow quota, which meant that herd sizes did not evolve substantially by 1993 and that 
most producers had sufficient rights in 1993 based on their 1992 claim. Secondly, the 
obligations for quota usage placed on producers who receive rights from the national reserve 
and the introduction of the density factor in suckler cow eligibility may have dissuaded 
producers initially from applying. However, since census data show that suckler cow 
numbers arc increasing across the Union, information on the development of the national 
reserves in 1995, not yet made available to the Commission by all Member States, will be 
particularly indicative of the current state of the quota policy across the Union. 
iv) With regard to the management of the national reserves, in general terms, the system can be 
said to operate well. However, the data available to the Commission suggest that, particularly 
in the sheep sector, there is some divergence in the criteria for attribution of rights in that 
some Member States are operating a 'recycling' of rights, i.e. withdrawal and reallocation of 
rights to other producers in the same year while others are not. The reasons for this 
difference may be that in some Member States there is a known lack of demand from 
producers for rights and recycling would presumably not be necessary while other Member 
States may have chosen administrative procedures which result in the 'recycling' of rights 
being made in the year following withdrawal. 
v) For reasons of controlling production and reducing quota speculation, the Commission 
wishes to comment that, in its opinion, 'recycling' of rights can encourage inflated 
applications for premiums 14. The Commission recognizes that the current Council legislation 
In effect, with this approach, the number of rights to 'recycle' wiil only be known after the end of the 
application period for premium. Producers must therefore make their premium claim without knowing to what 
extent the Member State can meet their request for supplementary rights free from the national reserve. Certain 
U 
leaves the management of the national reserves largely in the hands of the Member States 
and that there are no provisions covering deadlines for the distribution of the national 
reserves. However, the Commission invites Member States to take the necessary 
implementing measures in order to distribute the national reserve before the end of the 
application period for premium, that is, before the end of the transfer and leasing period. 
c) Systems of quota transfer 
vi) Notwithstanding the comments made above with reference to national reserves, the 
Commission draws Council's attention to the fact that the second trading periods, justifiably 
conceded to Member States in the past, are related to this issue in that they permitted 
producers to optimize, in effect, their quota usage in 1993 and 1994. Consequently, the 
Commission announces that, from now on, it will take a far harder line against second 
trading periods, confident that the initial problems experienced by producers and 
administrations with the setting up of the quota regime are now overcome. 
vii) Concerning the national systems for the transfer of rights, the Commission emphasizes that 
major efforts have been made to accommodate the requests of Member States for more 
llexible transfer procedures but that measures which would lead to too great a divergence 
between the 'commercial' system and the 'administrative' system, have been refused. For this 
reason, the Commission has not been prepared to admit leasing of rights through the national 
reserve since, under the 'administrative' system, this would mean that individual quotas 
would tend to operate as regional ceilings, with all the inconveniences in terms of control 
("maitrise") of production that such ceilings incur. 
viii) In relation to the same question of national systems for transfers, the Commission notes the 
fact that the low monetary value attributed to rights by the French administration is causing 
producers to retain unused rights. The Commission hopes that the changes made to the usage 
rules from 1996 onwards will help alleviate the problem of low quota availability. 
d) Sensitive Zones 
ix) The Commission reaffirms that the direct consequence of 'ring-fencing' of premium rights 
is to limit the transfer of rights within a Member State. However, the Commission remarks 
that, due to the different criteria which have been used to establish Sensitive /ones in each 
Member State, a practical consequence of this provision is that rights may not be transferred 
between all zones or all Member States of the Union. 
x) The Commission is aware that, in certain instances, it has been suggested that the 'ring-
fencing' of quota within a Member State is beginning to exert a negative impact on the rural 
environment, by accumulating rights within their boundaries, which is an undesirable 
consequence of this provision. Therefore, the Commission draws Member States' attention 
to this topic, with a view to finding a better balance between the socio-economic objectives 
of this provision and certain objective criteria of environmental protection. 
producers, in the hope of receiving the supplementary rights they have requested, will tend to inflate their 
premium claim and therefore retain more animals than their individual quota. 
12 
e) Concluding remarks 
In view of the above evaluation, the Commission concludes that individual producer limits 
have so far been a successful policy tool for controlling production and expenditure in the 
sheep sector but not in the suckler cow segment of the beef sector. Therefore, given that 
changes in the ewe premium regime are not justified and that the whole beef regime is under 
review in the light of the current BSE crisis, the Commission considers that it is not an 
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ANNEX IV 
APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR EWE PREMIUM - EC12 
APPUCATION DE LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA BREBIS - CE12 
ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR12 
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ANNEX V 
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APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR SUCKLER COWS - EC12 
APPLICATION DES LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - CE12 
ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERKUHPRÂMIE - EUR12 
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ANNEX VI 
INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES - EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 
LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES DANS LES NOUVEAUX ETATS-MEMBRES - PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE 1 
ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHE OBERGRENZEN IN DEN NEUEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN - MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN 1 
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ANNEX VII 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO EWE AND GOAT PREMIUM - EU151 
DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA CHEVRE - UE15 1 
INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÛCHE AUF MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERZIEGENPRÂMIE * EUR151 
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1 Based on information supplied by Member States 
2 Verified by the Commission with exception of Deutschland and Italy (Sicily) 
3 Including 600.000 additional rights for Italy and Greece 
4 Excluding New Lander 
5 Art 5e(1) of Reg. 3013/89 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO SUCKLER COW PREMIUM - EU15 (1) 
DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - UE15 






























































































































































































1 ) Except for those In column B, ad figures are provisionat; figures are besed on Information supplied by Member States (TO BE VERIFIED BY THE COMMISSION). 
2) Former Lander only. 
3) Regulation (EEC) 805/68, ArUd(6) and Annex II. 4) R (EEC) 805/68, Art.4d(3) and R.(EEC) 3886/92. Art.29. 
5) Regulation (EEC) 3888/92, Art.38(3). Estimated figures (in the case of FR •/-15.000). 6) R.(EEC) 3886/92, Art. 29. 
7) Not including rights resulting from the former German Lander switch. Régulation (EEC) 805/68 Art 4k(1 Xb). 
8) Not including add'itional rights destined to DOM (fewer than 35.000 rights). Regulation (EEC) 3763/91 Art.5(3) as amended by R.(EC) 2598/95. 




EVOLUTION IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED - (1992-1995) 
EVOLUTION DES PRIMES OCTROYEES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - (1992-1995) 
ENTWICKLUNG DER GEWAHRTEN MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRAMIEN - (1992-1995) 

























































































































































































































 information provided by Member States 
(figures in italics are provisional or estimated daim data) 
1 From Annex VI 
2 From Annex VII 
ANNEX X 
t o 
OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - EWE PREMIUM 
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA BREBIS 
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1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 
2 Derived from Art 5c of Reg. 3013/89 
3 Figures liable to change as a resuit of reassessment of national reserve attribution 
ANNEX XI 
OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE 
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1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 
2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 
3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 
4 Former Lander only 
5 Figures liable to change follwoing reassessment of attribution 
ANNEX XII 
l\i 
OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - EWE PREMIUM 1 
FONCTIONNEMENT DE RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA BREBIS 1 































































































































1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92 
2 Derived from Art, 5c of Reg. 3013/89 
3 Figures liable to change following reassessment of the national reserve attribution 
ANNEX XIII 
N 
OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM 1 
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE1 
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1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92 
2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68 
3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92 
4 Former Lander only 
5 Figure liable to change following reassessment of 1993 attribution 
CALENDAR FOR EWE PREMIUM APPLICATIONS IN 1995 - EU15 
CALENDRIER POUR LES DEMANDES DE PRIME A LA BREBIS EN 1995 - UE15 
ZEUPLAN FUR DIE BEANTRAGUNG DER MUTTERSCHAFPRAMIE - EUR15 
ANNEX XIV 
tV3 
MEMBER STATE Deadlina for Parmanant Deadlina for Tamporary Pariod for Application for Deadline for attributing Period for Premium Retention Period Period for Application 















United Kingdom -6B 
•NI 
14 Oct 1994 
31 Mar 1995 
1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994 
1 Feb 1995 
31 Mar 1995 
8 Jan 1995 
23 Jan 1995 
24 Mar 1995 
20 Jan 1995 
14-DBC-94 
not applicable 
15 Dec 1994 
not applicable 
9 Mar 1995 
20 Feb 1995 
20 Feb 1995 
14 Oct 1994 
31 Mar 1995 
1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994 
1 Feb 1995 
31 Mar 1995 
31 Mar 1995 
23 Jan 1995 
24 Mar 1995 
20 Jan 1995 
not applicable 
not applicable 
15 Dec 1994 
not applicable 
9 Mar 1995 
20 Feb 1995 
20 Feb 1995 
15 Dec-18 Jan 
31 Dec 1994 
1-31 Jan 1994 
1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 
before 31 Oct 1994 
before 30 Nov 1994 
before 16 Dec 1994 
before 15 Feb 1995 
5 Dec-30 Dec 1994 
not applicable 
15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 
not applicable 
1 - 31 Jan 1995 
1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 
1 Dec-31 Jan 1996 
1 Mar 1995 
none 
15 Jan 1995 
31 Oct 1995 
16 Apr 1995 
20 Feb 1995 
not applicable 
7 Sep 1995 
not applicable 
20 Feb 1995 
not yet known 
not yet known 
15 Dec 1994-16 Jan 1995 
1 - 31 Mar 1995 
1-31 Jan 1995 
1 Doc 1994-15 Feb 1995 
1-31 Mar 1995 
6-31 Jan 1995 
1) 3 -23 Jan 1995 
2) 1-16 Mar 1995 (c) 
15 Feb-24 Mar 1995 
1 Feb-15 Feb 1995 
20 Feb -23 Mar 1995 
7 - 31 Jan 1995 
15 Jan-28 Feb 1995 
13-31 Mar 1995 
1 -31 Mar 1995 
1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 
2) 15 Jan-20 Feb 1995 
1)15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 
2) 15 Feb-15 Mar 1995 
17 Jan-26 Apr 1995 
1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995 
1 Feb-11 May 1995 
16 Feb-26 May 1995 
'1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995 
31 Jan-10 May 1995 
1) 23 Jan - 2 May 1995 
2) 16 Mar-23 Jun 1995(c) 
25 Mar-2 Jul 1995 
15 Feb-25 May 1995 
23 Mar • 30 Jun 1995 
1 Feb-11 May 1995 
1 Mar-8 Jun 19951 
1 Apr • 9 Jul 1995 
1 Apr-9 Jul 1995 
1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 
2)21 Feb 1995-31 May 1995 
1)16 Dec 1994-25 Mar 1995 
2) 15 Mar 1995-23 Jun 1995 
15 Dec-16 Jan 
not applicable 
1 Dec 1994-15 Feb 1995 
1-31 Mar 1995 
6 - 31 Jan 1995 
not applicable 
15 Feb-24 Mar 
not applicable 
not applicable 
15 Jan -28 Feb 1995 
not applicable 
1-30 Apr 1995 
15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 
15 Nov-15 Dec 1994 
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